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Abstract 
Having explained their adoption, analysts are now trying to understand how EU environmental 
policies have subsequently evolved over time. In 2003, David Vogel famously speculated that 
having overtaken the US in the environmental race to the top, EU policies would also 
eventually succumb to policy gridlock, i.e. neither expanding nor dismantling.  Empirical 
research has since confirmed that EU policy expansion is in decline, but less is known about 
why dismantling has also been very limited.  This article breaks new ground by reconfiguring 
dismantling – a concept developed for national policy systems – to explain the various 
dismantling strategies deployed at EU level (1992 to 2016).  It finds that the absence of 
significant dismantling is due both to the symbolic nature of early dismantling attempts and the 
failure of more recent attempts to build coalitions that overcome institutional obstacles to 
policy change in the EU. 
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Introduction 
 
Leadership in the development of new policies has been a longstanding theme in environmental 
policy analysis.  The conventional wisdom is that until the 1980s, the US was the world‟s 
environmental lead state.  Its environmental policies were demonstratively more ambitious than 
the EU‟s. But in a highly influential article published in 2003, Vogel argued that things started 
to change after 1990. His core claim – that throughout the 1990s the European „tortoise‟ 
gradually caught up and, in many respects, overtook the American „hare‟ as political opposition 
to new policies grew – has been repeatedly confirmed by subsequent developments (Vogel 
2012).  Into the early 2000s, the EU continued to move seemingly ineluctably towards what 
Weale et al. (2002) termed an „ever closer ecological union‟. And in international negotiations, 
evidence of the EU exerting its power to push up international standards, has continued to 
accumulate (Selin & VanDeveer 2015) – such as in the area of climate change (Oberthür & 
Groen 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, Vogel argued that weakened support for new policies in the US after 1990 also 
went hand in hand with political demands for what he termed policy roll-back – or what is now 
more commonly referred to as policy dismantling i.e. „the cutting, diminution or removal of 
existing policy‟ (Jordan, Bauer, & Green-Pedersen 2013, p. 795). These demands were 
amplified in the subsequent W. Bush and Trump administrations (Layzer 2012, Klyza & Sousa 
2013, Bomberg 2017). When Vogel completed his 2003 article, attempts to achieve dismantling 
were also running into political opposition, this time from pro-environment interests.  The net 
result of limited expansion and limited dismantling was what he termed policy gridlock (ibid). 
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Vogel concluded his article with a bold prediction: that having caught up with the US, the EU 
would continue to follow in its footsteps, gradually moving in a less environmentally ambitious 
direction. Crucially, he claimed that the state of policy gridlock in the US after 1990 would „at 
some point occur in Europe‟ (Vogel 2003, p. 580).  But has it?  
 
EU environmental legislation has grown from a few dozen laws in the 1970s to over 400 pieces 
(Delreux & Happaerts 2016). This growth has been at the heart of the EU‟s emergence as an 
environmental „Regulatory State‟ (Majone 1999) and has attracted the attention of many policy 
scholars. Their work has revealed that after three decades of significant policy expansion, the 
Commission significantly reduced the number of new policy proposals after the late 2000s.  
Policy sectors such as the environment and health were particularly heavily affected (Kassim, 
Connolly, Dehousse, Rozenberg, & Bendjaballah 2017). This pattern of events has confirmed 
the first part of Vogel‟s prediction: that policy expansion would stall. 
 
What about the other part: that policy dismantling would fail? The rapid rise up the EU‟s 
agenda of new discourses of better regulation and „fitness checking‟ has certainly attracted the 
attention of analysts (Gravey & Jordan 2016; Steinebach & Knill 2017). But studies of 
environmental policy dismantling at EU level have been much more limited. Dismantling has 
generally been studied at national, rather than at EU level.  Over three decades ago, Hanf 
(1989), for example, analysed the deregulation of environmental policy in the Netherlands. 
More recently Jordan & Turnpenny (2012) and Bernauer & Knill (2012) have studied 
dismantling in the UK and Germany respectively. Initial studies of the content of policies at EU 
level, have, however, suggested that significant dismantling is not occurring at EU level. 
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Various studies (e.g. Gravey 2016; Schaffrin, Sewerin, & Seubert 2015; Steinebach & Knill 
2017; Burns, Eckersley & Tobin 2019) have, for example, pointed out that in spite of multiple 
political demands for and discourse of policy dismantling, EU environmental policies have not 
been dismantled across the board. In fact, in some cases the policies targeted for reform have 
become more not less stringent (Benson & Jordan 2014). 
 
Hence, growing political demands for policy dismantling in the EU are not (yet) translating into 
significant policy change. What we do not really understand is why. In this article we make an 
original contribution by investigating how far the observed absence of significant policy 
dismantling can be explained by analysing the various dismantling strategies that have been 
deployed, i.e. the „mode[s], method[s] or plan[s] chosen to bring about a desired dismantling 
effect‟ (Bauer & Knill 2014, p. 37). We address the puzzling co-existence of growing 
dismantling discourses but limited dismantling of policy outputs by paying closer attention to 
the intervening process: namely the selection and implementation of dismantling strategies. We 
do so by analyzing the selection and deployment of dismantling strategies at EU level over an 
extended period of nearly 25 years (1992 – 2016). This period extends from the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty up to the 2016 UK referendum, prior to which the Cameron Government 
listed policy dismantling as one of its four main demands in order to preserve the UK‟s 
membership (Cameron, 2015). 
 
Section two briefly reviews what has been learnt – both empirically and theoretically – about 
dismantling since Vogel‟s article. It sets out how we will analyse different dismantling 
strategies and, more specifically, how we will differentiate between them empirically. We claim 
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that the explicit and visible attempts to dismantle noted above align with two distinct strategies 
developed by Bauer et al. (2012): active dismantling and symbolic dismantling. We investigate 
whether the absence of notable dismantling is best explained by the deployment of active 
dismantling strategies that fail (i.e. an active decision to dismantle that nevertheless yields no 
policy dismantling) or the use of symbolic dismantling strategies (i.e. dismantling in name 
only), by identifying and testing three possible explanations.  Drawing on Pierson (1996) and 
Bauer et al. (2012), a first explanation would be that decision-makers failed to assemble a 
sufficiently large winning coalition on what and how to dismantle – in effect foundering on the 
various hurdles in the EU‟s hyper consensual system. A second possible explanation is that 
although politicians managed to agree what and how to dismantle, they subsequently faced 
opposition from interest groups and voters (what Vogel claimed had happened in the US after 
1990). A third possible explanation is the commitment to dismantle was only ever symbolic. 
Symbolic dismantling refers to a situation in which explicit commitments to dismantle are 
deliberately not followed through by decision-makers, being limited to symbolic activities such 
as „relabeling policies [and]… commissioning consultations/evaluation reports‟ (Bauer & Knill 
2012, p.46). Section three presents our empirical findings, encompassing the selection and 
deployment of dismantling strategies at EU level. Finally, section four discusses our findings in 
relation to Vogel‟s predictions about the long-term relationship between expansion and 
dismantling and arrives at some conclusions with regards to how far EU environmental policy 
has, like the US, succumbed to a form of policy gridlock. It also reflects on the implications of 
our findings for future research on policy dismantling, EU integration and environmental policy 
leadership. 
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Studying policy dismantling: the neglected role of reframing and venue-shopping  
 
Since Vogel‟s article on US environmental policy gridlock was published in 2003 other analysts 
have tried to add more fine-grained empirical detail.  For example, Klyza and Sousa (2010) 
argued that the US environmental policies adopted in the 1960s, 70s and 80s created a 
supportive policy regime – a „Green State‟ – that opposed dismantling in Congress.  Thus, pro-
environmental actors had „simply to play defense to protect old commitments, typically an 
advantageous position in the American political system‟ (2010, p. 445). This broadly equates to 
our Explanation 1.  It also echoed both Vogel‟s findings and (incidentally) Pierson‟s earlier 
arguments (1996) about how policy feedback sustains the welfare state (Jordan & Matt 2014). 
 
Vogel concluded by pointing to the way in which dismantling was increasingly being blocked 
by Congress, but more recent studies have underlined the need to look „beyond legislative 
gridlock‟ (Klyza & Sousa 2013) and examine attempts both to strengthen and weaken policies 
across multiple venues – i.e. in the courts, in different states etc. Korte & Joergens (2012) have 
usefully shown how a particular venue – the executive branch – can be used to weaken policies 
in the absence of congressional support, through budget cuts and political appointments. Hence, 
when, as in the US, governance is multi-levelled, analysts should be alive to the possibility that 
dismantling advocates (and opponents) may choose to switch their strategies to venues that are 
more (or less) conducive to the building of coalitions of support. 
 
Finally, in exploring the agenda setting stages of the policy process, Layzer (2012) emphasized 
that advocates of dismantling must also win the battle for attention just as advocates of policy 
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expansion must, for example by emphasizing particular frames or ideas.  She argued that after 
the 1980s, the US environmental movement lost the battle of ideas with conservatives, who 
reframed the issue into one of how to boost economic growth by dismantling existing policies 
and cutting „red tape‟. In the similarly multi-levelled governance context of the EU, frames and 
venues are potentially even more important than in the US; they are a means to „gain…. 
attention‟ and „build… credibility‟ (Princen 2011, p. 928) – necessary conditions that have to be 
satisfied to achieve a winning coalition in favour of policy change, including dismantling. 
 
In summary, the US literature suggests that venue-shopping and/or reframing are likely to be 
central to the pursuit of policy dismantling in the EU. Crucially, the vagaries of agenda setting 
explain why „retrenchment opportunities wax and wane while institutional arrangements change 
slowly or not at all‟ (Sheingate 2000, p. 336). For EU analysts, the US literature also 
underscores the need to think about how pro and anti-dismantling coalitions are built and 
sustained over time, including via the selection and deployment of different dismantling 
strategies, as these will be central to our Explanation 1. 
 
In their study of national policy, Bauer and Knill (2014) suggested that there are, in principle, 
four ideal-types of dismantling strategy.  These are based on two questions: first, whether the 
„political decision to dismantle is actively and consciously taken or not‟; and second, to what 
extent „political actors wish to hide or reveal their dismantling activities‟ (2014, p. 38). This 
creates two cleavages: between active and passive dismantling (i.e. whether politicians actively 
pursue dismantling or let it happen during their term of office without engaging with it); and 
between open and hidden dismantling (i.e. whether politicians try to avoid blame or claim 
credit). 
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<<insert Table 1 here >> 
 
As this article focuses on explaining the puzzling coexistence of dismantling talk and very little 
dismantling in practice (Gravey & Jordan 2016), we are particularly interested in the distinction 
between active dismantling and symbolic dismantling. Bauer and Knill (2014) suggest that these 
two are ideal-types: symbolic dismantling is evidenced by the commissioning of reports and/or 
the announcement that cuts will in future be made; by contrast, active dismantling is evidenced 
by cuts to the number of or the stringency of policies. But how can we distinguish between 
them empirically? And more specifically, how can we distinguish between failed active 
dismantling and symbolic dismantling? We do so by conceptualizing the strategies as two 
opposite points on a continuum of dismantling types, ranging from no or very limited initiative 
to pursue dismantling to a number of concrete policy initiatives (successful or not) to cut, 
remove or weaken policy outputs (see Table 2). 
 
<<insert Table 2 here>> 
 
 
As one moves from the „symbolic‟ to the „active‟ end of this continuum, the empirical indicator 
is the growing number of deliberate policy initiatives, such as attempts to reframe dismantling 
in a new way or change the venue in which it is pursued in order to increase support for (or 
decrease opposition to) it.  This relates to what Princen (2011, p.933) has described as linking 
policy initiatives „with established overall values that are held to be central to the EU‟s „purpose 
and identity‟ or with „stated policy priorities and commitments‟ to garner sufficient support. 
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Hence, a member State strategy of commissioning a report on EU „red tape‟ would be 
considered symbolic. But if the member State subsequently followed up on that by building a 
political coalition to turn „tackling red tape‟ into an EU-wide effort it would move towards the 
more active end of our continuum. 
 
The rest of this article analyses the environmental policy dismantling strategies that have been 
employed at EU level from 1992 to 2016. How dismantling is framed by political actors and in 
which venues it is pursued, is explored using two types of historical data. First, documents from 
the Commission, Parliament and member states, as well as reports from think tanks and civil 
society organisations were collected and coded using NVIVO. This data was used to identify 
the relationship between particular political actors, the targets of policy dismantling targets and 
the associated frames and venues. Second, we undertook seventeen elite interviews with actors 
in the EU institutions (in the Commission, member states and Parliament) and in wider civil 
society (e.g. environmental NGOs, business lobbies, etc.). 
 
Environmental policy dismantling: a long-term perspective 
 
On 2 June 1992, the Danish people voted down the Maastricht Treaty – the first time that voters 
had openly voted against deeper European integration.  The EU Presidency at the time (July-
December 1992) was held by the UK.  It was tasked with bringing Denmark back into the fold.  
The UK eagerly seized this opportunity to advocate the dismantling of a range of (mostly 
environmental) policies which were causing it implementation difficulties at home (Jordan 
2002). It did so by reframing dismantling as being consistent with subsidiarity, a principle that 
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had long been discussed at EU level but was only formally integrated into the EU Treaties, 
alongside proportionality, by the Maastricht Treaty (Golub 1996).  The UK calculated that such 
reframing would be a more successful dismantling strategy if it was perceived to achieve „stated 
policy priorities and commitments‟ (Princen 2011, p. 933) – i.e. to deepen European integration 
by securing Danish ratification. 
 
However, its attempts at reframing were only partly successful.  Reacting to the Danish „no‟, 
the June 1992 European Council adopted a moderate interpretation of subsidiarity, i.e. that „all 
future legislative proposals‟ should be subsidiarity-proofed (ENDS Report, 1992).  Inside the 
European Parliament, the UK Chair of the Environment Committee, Ken Collins, expressed 
grave concerns that subsidiarity would be used to dismantle the entire environmental acquis 
(Agence Europe 1992a). These concerns were later echoed by the European Parliament‟s 
President, Egon Klepsch, who argued that the Parliament would „energetically oppose any 
attempt to misuse the principle of subsidiarity in order to return to national policies or to 
intergovernmental cooperation‟ (Agence Europe 1992b).  Conversely, the UK‟s Commissioner 
Leon Brittan supported the UK government approach and argued that the Commission should 
show greater „self-restraint‟ in future (Agence Europe 1992c). The 1992 UK Presidency thus 
followed a two-pronged approach: subsidiarity should be applied to both new proposals (as 
already agreed in June) and to the most problematic parts of the existing acquis.  
 
The UK‟s preferred dismantling strategy was to draw up lists of policies that the EU should 
agree to dismantle.  However, the key venue for dismantling would be the Commission (as it 
held a monopoly over new EU legislative proposals), not the Council.  Therefore, the UK 
Presidency invited the Commission President Jacques Delors to draw up an EU-wide hit list (The 
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Independent 1992). However, as a venue, the Commission was not especially conducive to 
dismantling.  The Commission, particularly under Delors, was emphatically pro-integration.  
Unsurprisingly, the Commission‟s list contained 20 proposals for new legislation – amongst 
them one (on zoos) that was only indirectly environmental – that could be removed, not items of 
the existing acquis. However, the Commission made somewhat vague and symbolic promises to 
update rather than dismantle existing legislation. Unsatisfied with Delors‟ list, the UK 
Presidency produced its own list (Financial Times 1992). Leaked to the press shortly before the 
Edinburgh summit, it listed 37 directives and regulations (plus 34 proposals for new policy) for 
dismantling. Amongst the environmental items on that list, the UK suggested that one directive 
be completely repealed (shellfish waters) and five others weakened (relating to wildlife habitats, 
hazardous waste, bathing, drinking and ground-water respectively). 
 
In effect, the lack of political agreement at EU level (our Explanation 1) spawned two parallel 
processes, each focused on a particular venue. First, a Commission-led process centred on the 
production of annual reports on the implementation of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles (European Commission 1993). Second, the UK, France and eventually Germany, 
engaged in more listing activities. The UK and France produced a combined hit list in 1993, 
targeting a mixture of new proposals and existing policies (covering habitats, zoo animals and 
environmental impact assessment) (Reuters 1993). Germany followed up with its own hit list 
(with a sole environmental target: the proposal for a zoos directive) which received little support. 
However, Germany profoundly changed its tactics during its 1994 Council Presidency (Wurzel 
2002), by reframing dismantling in terms of the pursuit of proportionality and competitiveness. It 
also pushed for a venue change. Writing on agricultural policy dismantling, Sheingate argued 
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that clear „jurisdictional boundaries‟ and the use of the unanimity rule renders venue shopping 
within the EU much harder than in the US (2000, p. 357). The German Presidency tried to 
circumvent these obstacles by forming a new, independent ad hoc group to review the entire 
acquis.  Known as the Molitor group, it was the first EU-wide effort to investigate the scope for 
dismantling the entire acquis. Although invoking different frames (i.e. proportionality instead of 
subsidiarity), Germany continued in the UK‟s footsteps by arguing that dismantling was „pro-
European‟ and would also bring the EU closer to its citizens (Agence Europe 1994). 
 
The next (Santer) Commission openly supported Germany‟s attempt to reframe dismantling.  It 
pledged to „look-out for rules that are cumbersome, excessive and archaic‟ (European 
Commission 1995, p. 10). It supported the Molitor group and when that eventually ran out of 
steam through lack of active support from France (ENDS Report 1995) and the European 
Parliament, it developed new dismantling processes including consulting industry stakeholders 
(SLIM) and national experts (BEST) (European Commission 1998a).  The Commission duly 
removed over 130 existing proposals and sharply reduced the number of new ones (European 
Commission 1998b). Santer‟s determination to do „less but better‟ led him to advocate that each 
member state should set up its own better regulation unit (European Commission 1998a). 
Nevertheless, he resisted UK calls to establish one inside the Commission, suggesting that his 
personal commitment to dismantling was rather symbolic (House of Commons 1998) – in line 
with our Explanation 3.  
The Commission subsequently came under added pressure when an internal political scandal in 
1999 led to the resignation of the entire Commission.  Santer‟s successor, Romano Prodi, 
embarked on a fresh round of reforms spurred on by the European Council, which in 2000 
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claimed that „further efforts are required to lower the costs of doing business and remove 
unnecessary red tape‟ and called for better regulation (European Council 2000, p. 4). 
Better regulation has been understood from „three general perspectives‟ which can involve „(1) 
technocratic (evidence-based) policy-making; (2) deregulation or (3) participatory policy-
making‟ (Bunea & Ibenskas 2017, p. 593). Hence, while Prodi‟s plans for better regulation are 
often viewed through the narrow prism of impact assessment (Radaelli & Meuwese 2009), i.e. 
increasing the evidence-base of new policymaking, it is also important to remember that it was 
originally framed as a means to „simplify…. existing legislation, in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms‟ (European Commission 2001, p. 4). This simplification was presented as „an 
absolute necessity for the future of the European Union‟ (European Commission 2001, p. 2). 
Thus, policy dismantling was in effect being reframed, this time into a means of delivering 
better regulation.  The Commission duly set itself wildly ambitious targets, such as to reduce the 
number of existing policies by 25 percent by 2005 (European Commission 2001), to remove 
proposals if amendments through the legislative process were disproportionate or undermined 
subsidiarity (European Commission 2001, p. 18), and to create „a new administrative and 
political culture‟ at EU level (European Commission 2001, p. 9). The Prodi Commission 
eventually failed to meet its 25 percent reduction target, which it blamed on the lack of political 
support from the Council and the European Parliament (European Commission 2004, p. 10). 
 
The struggle to achieve sufficient political support appeared to ease when, in 2004, a larger 
coalition of member states (Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK – later joined by 
Austria and Finland) (Six Presidencies 2004)) coordinated their Presidencies of the EU to push 
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for much deeper regulatory reform. Crucially, they managed to agree on a single hit list 
(Council of the European Union 2004) for „simplification‟ – a term which effectively brought 
more states on-board.  This list comprised a much larger number of environmental policies (5 
out of 17), all dealing with waste policy dismantling. Examples of dismantling included cutting 
policy instruments (obligation to inform citizens, compliance checks on public administrations) 
framed as reducing excessive administrative burdens.  In addition to targeting specific policies, 
the Six Presidencies also attempted to reframe the better regulation agenda on to the narrower 
issue of administrative burden reduction (Six Presidencies 2004), an approach originally 
developed by the Netherlands and subsequently adopted by other member states, such as the 
UK and Germany (Wegrich 2009). 
 
The start of the Barroso I Commission was overshadowed by yet another political shock in 2005 
– the French and Dutch „no‟ votes against the Constitutional Treaty. As with the Danish „no‟ to 
Maastricht, this shock event was quickly seized on by some member states to pursue their pre-
existing dismantling plans. For example, the UK 2005 Presidency again framed dismantling as 
something that would save Europe from itself: 
 
„We need to have allies for this approach, we need to build up alliances in the 
European Union, and we are determined to do so because we are doing it very 
much from a pro-European perspective. To be honest, if we approach it from any 
other perspective…  it will disappear‟ (John Hutton MP, in House of Lords EU 
Committee 2005, p. 22). 
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The Commission re-launched its better regulation strategy in 2005, but, in an effort to avoid 
blame, stressed that it was not about deregulation (Agence Europe 2005). In 2007 it initiated a 
new programme to reduce administrative burdens (with the old target of a 25 percent reduction 
accompanied by a new deadline - 2012), but stressed that it would really focus on unnecessary 
burdens (European Commission 2007). It also organised a new group (a High-Level Expert 
Group on Administrative Burdens) chaired by Edmund Stoiber. One interviewee remarked that 
it was „a tool in the hands of the Commission, to show outside support for this reduction of 
administrative burdens agenda‟ (Interview: Environment NGO 11.2014). Inside support 
beginning to grow in the higher echelons of the Commission and in DG Enterprise too. Its 
Commissioner Günter Verheugen was placed in charge of burden reduction (European Voice 
2006), but he struggled to construct a political coalition (note, Explanation 1) as he had no 
direct authority over the legislative activities of other DGs (Interview: Business Lobby 
02.2015). Verheugen‟s effort to limit policy expansion similarly floundered when Verheugen 
and Barroso‟s joint attempt to prevent the adoption of new environmental policy strategies 
failed in the College of Commissioners when the then Environment Commissioner, Stavros 
Dimas, won the support of his fellow Commissioners (ENDS Report 2005). 
Despite supporting Verheugen during his first term, Barroso‟s focus on better regulation greatly 
increased in his second term (when he „suddenly woke up to better regulation‟ (Interview: UK 
Official 01.2015), and, for the environmental movement, it „clearly got worse under Barroso II‟ 
(Interview: Environment NGO 11.2014b)). Barroso reformed the Commission when he 
launched his „smart regulation‟ initiative in 2010, bringing all better regulation activities 
together in the Secretariat General, under his „direct responsibility‟ (European Commission, 
2010, p. 2). This changed the dynamic because the body overseeing policy dismantling now had 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
18 
 
„some formal power and a lot of informal power‟ (Interview: Commission official 02.2015) – 
and used it to enforce the Barroso‟s political priorities (Zaun 2014) over the legislative DGs 
which remained „not very supportive with very few exceptions‟ (Interview: Commission official 
11.2014). Thus pro-dismantling advocates within the Commission did not stop at venue 
shopping (i.e. shifting dismantling responsibilities from one DG to another) but also engaged in 
venue shaping and even venue creation, with the creation of numerous expert groups (from 
Molitor to Stoiber) and the empowerment of the Secretariat (Kassim et al. 2017). 
 
The Barroso II Commission further reframed dismantling attempts – moving beyond 
administrative to also include regulatory burdens through its EU Regulatory Fitness (REFIT) 
programme. Legislation and proposals which were deemed unfit would either be revised or 
repealed/withdrawn. Crucially, while REFIT initially targeted „unnecessary‟ regulatory burdens 
(European Commission 2012, p. 2), in 2014 this caveat was removed and pledges were made to 
„cut red tape, remove regulatory burdens‟ (European Commission 2014b, p. 2). 
 
Although EU environmental policy was not expanding significantly around this time (ENDS 
Europe 2013), existing policies nonetheless still ranked high on many stakeholder hit-lists 
(Business Taskforce 2013, European Commission 2013). This lead a Commission official to 
remark that „when people are talking about Brussels legislation they always pick on the 
environment‟ (Interview: Commission Official 2.2015b), and an environmentalist to contend 
that when it came to cutting „red tape‟, „the environment is being singled out, particularly at the 
European level‟ (Interview: Environmental NGO, 11.2014b). Out of nine active policy 
proposals withdrawn under REFIT (European Commission, 2014a), two were flagship 
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environmental proposals: one on access to justice, the other on soils. Environment 
Commissioner Potočnik was by this point „very isolated inside the Commission (….) always in 
a minority position‟ (Interview: Commission official 06.2015) and saw his proposals on plastic 
bags and the circular economy repeatedly delayed (ENDS Europe, 2014). 
 
Outside of the Commission, certain member states argued that REFIT was not going far 
enough. In 2013, the Dutch Government re-invoked the subsidiarity framing, stating it was 
„convinced that the time of an „ever closer union‟ in every possible policy area is behind us‟ 
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2013, p. 1). Conversely, David Cameron questioned the 
validity of the Commission‟s work, its review process, and requested Treaty change (Business 
Taskforce 2013; Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2012). He tried to build coalitions in the 
Council to upload the UK‟s preferred dismantling model – a one [policy]-in, one-out rule. 
While such a move was supported by the Stoiber group (High Level Group on Administrative 
Burdens 2014) and business (Business Europe 2014), it only received support from seven other 
member states. In France, President Hollande decried „blind regulation‟ (L‟Expansion 2013) 
while in Germany, Chancellor Merkel extolled the „exceptional contribution‟ of the 
Commission‟s REFIT plan (Bundesregierung.de 2013).  Thus, by the end of the Barroso II 
Commission, and recalling Explanation 1, there was still no EU-wide dismantling coalition 
capable of bridging the gap between Commission-led reform efforts and the alliance of states 
demanding radical dismantling. 
 
While Barroso II had already put greater emphasis on better regulation and dismantling than 
Barroso I, the early years of the Juncker Commission marked „a change from “saying to doing”‟ 
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(Interview: Commission Official 02.2015). Inside the College of Commissioners, Juncker 
furthered Barroso‟s centralisation of power and created the position of First Vice President of 
the European Commission, with the responsibility for better regulation. These changes sought 
to strengthen the ability of central services „to shut down whatever they don‟t find politically 
convenient‟ (Interview, Environment NGO 11.2014c). Juncker, echoing Santer, also severely 
reduced the Commission‟s future work programme – there were only 23 proposals in the 2015 
programme compared to an average of 150 p.a. under Barroso. This went hand in hand with a 
conscious effort not to  automatically carry forward proposals from the previous Commission 
(under a new principle of political discontinuity) which resulted in the removal of 80 proposals. 
This attempt to reduce policy expansion was strongly criticised by environmental NGOs, the 
European Parliament and 11 member states.  Subsequently, the Commission was forced to 
partially back-track (Politico.EU 2014). In addition, Juncker wrote in the Environment 
Commissioner Karmenu Vella‟s appointment letter that his main priority was to „overhaul the 
existing environmental legislative framework to make it fit for purpose‟ (Juncker 2014, p. 4), 
including undertaking fitness check on the 1979 Birds and 1991 Habitats Directives. These two 
directives had recently been attacked by the UK government for „placing ridiculous costs on 
British businesses‟ – claims later contradicted by the UK government‟s own review (The 
Guardian 2012). 
 
Once again, policy dismantling was being framed as pro-EU, a way to „make sure the overall 
project is not going to be fundamentally threatened by a relatively negative discussion that we 
now see in a number of member states‟ (Interview: European Commission 11.2014). But this 
time, pushing for dismantling was perceived as being specifically linked to „the UK… 
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referendum and the opt-outs‟ (Ibid.). Hence, Cameron‟s renegotiation letter requested the 
Commission to continue its work of „scaling back unnecessary legislation‟, asking specifically 
for „a target to cut the total burden on business.‟ (2015, p.3).  Environmentalists argued that 
cutting EU red tape was Cameron‟s „only strategy to keep the UK in the EU‟ (Interview: 
Environment NGO 11.2014c), and that „the most rational explanation for Juncker‟s extreme 
deregulation agenda is the need to keep the UK in‟ (Interview: Environment NGO 11.2014b). 
 
Critically, the REFIT of the Birds and Habitats Directives did not proceed smoothly, for the UK 
or the Commission. Environmental NGOs across the EU mobilized their supporters to respond 
to the Commission‟s consultation; eventually over 500.000 respondents sided with the NGOs, 
thus illustrating the relevance of our Explanation 2.  This mobilization (the largest ever to a 
Commission consultation) included around 100,000 respondents from the UK (The Guardian, 
2016). Eventually, Cameron changed tactics and instead argued that both directives were a 
reason to vote for Remain in the EU referendum (Birdlife.org 2016). The Commission finally 
confirmed that the directives were „fit for purpose‟ in December 2016. 
 
Dismantling strategies at EU level: analysis and conclusions 
Between 1992 and 2016, there has been an ongoing debate amongst a growing cast of actors 
about when, why and how to dismantle environmental policy. Yet recent studies (Gravey & 
Jordan 2016; Steinebach & Knill 2017; Burns et al. 2019) have shown that large scale policy 
dismantling has not actually taken place.  Building on Pierson (1996) and Bauer and Knill 
(2014), we have argued that there are potentially three explanations for this failure to dismantle: 
1. a failure to assemble a sufficiently large winning coalition on what and how to dismantle; 2. a 
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failure to implement an agreement to dismantle because of opposition from interest groups 
and/or voters; or 3. symbolic dismantling where dismantling was never seriously intended by 
politicians. We tested these explanations by examining the various dismantling strategies 
deployed by various actors at EU level. We did so by taking Bauer & Knill‟s (2014) distinction 
between active and symbolic dismantling strategies and reconcentualising them as representing 
two ends of a continuum of types. We argued that analysts can determine whether a dismantling 
strategy is indeed „active‟ or simply „symbolic‟ by investigating the number and type of policy 
initiatives (such as attempts to reframe dismantling or change venue). 
 
We found notable changes in the dismantling strategies employed over time.  The strategies 
deployed in the 1990s tended towards the „symbolic‟ end of the continuum (i.e. Explanation 3); 
they could be described as either paying lip service to dismantling (such as the yearly reports 
from the Commission), or as short-lived and unable to summon majority support (e.g. hit lists 
from a handful of member states). In the 2000s and 2010s, the dismantling strategies moved 
away from the „symbolic‟ to the more „active‟ end of our continuum. They were sustained over 
longer periods of time and, one by one, the institutional obstacles to dismantling in the Council 
and the Commission were challenged. Within the Council, the idea of dismantling became less 
controversial: by 2004, the Dutch Presidency had managed to unite states around a single hit 
list. Moreover, by coordinating across Presidencies member states were able to pursue 
dismantling beyond their own 6-month term of office. Convincing a sufficiently large number 
of member states to dismantle a particular policy output nevertheless remained exceedingly 
difficult, given the vagaries of the issue attention cycle (Explanation 1). But certain frames – 
namely furthering competitiveness (especially after the Eurozone crisis) and pro-EU reform – 
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and certain venues (Competitiveness Council, Commission Secretariat General), appeared much 
more conducive to successful coalition-building than others. The Juncker Commission marked 
a further step change – both in its increasingly active support for dismantling (aiming to „cut red 
tape and remove regulatory burdens‟ (European Commission 2014c)) and in terms of public 
opposition to dismantling. Significantly, the Nature Alert campaign against the REFIT of the 
Birds and Habitats Directives marked the first and thus far only failure to implement dismantle 
due to opposition from interest groups and, in that case, civil society (i.e. corresponding to 
Explanation 2). 
 
This finding coupled with new research showing how policy expansion at EU level has levelled 
off (Kassim et al. 2017; Steinebach & Knill 2017; Burns et al. 2019) vindicates Vogel‟s (2003) 
core prediction, namely that EU environmental policy would follow the same path as the US and 
become steadily more gridlocked, with the environmental movement devoting more of its time 
and energy to playing a defensive game. Time will tell whether this marks the beginning of the 
end of the steady transition to what Weale et al. termed an „ever closer ecological union‟ (2002) 
or is a temporary hiatus. However, it definitely casts doubt on one of Vogel‟s more recent 
claims, namely that the „American policy tools of cost-benefit analyses and regulatory impact 
assessment‟ have had „little impact on the actual regulatory policies adopted by the EU‟ (Vogel, 
2013, p. 321). 
 
What do our finding tell us about the more general phenomenon of policy dismantling? Bauer et 
al. (2012) hypothesized that dismantling advocates would pursue open „credit claiming‟ 
strategies instead of more hidden „blame avoidance‟ strategies to dismantle green rules. 
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Although the dismantling strategies we detected were open, actors often framed their arguments 
to avoid blame, stressing that dismantling was not deregulation, or arguing dismantling would 
strengthen European integration. In that respect, environmental policy dismantling at EU level is 
an example of the ongoing politicization of the EU level, which has „affected all EU actors‟ 
actions and interactions, making for a „new‟ dynamics of EU governance that is more political in 
every way‟ (Schmidt 2018, p.1548). Our findings show that the politicization of policies at EU 
level can also be used by some to defend the EU‟s polity. This defence can be linked both to 
Explanation 1 – some member states struggling to build a sufficiently large coalition because 
their peers view dismantling as anti-EU – but also, gradually, under Explanation 2, where civil 
society becomes more involved in shaping the implementation of dismantling „on the ground‟. 
The Nature Alert campaign in 2016 prevented the Commission from dismantling the nature 
directives; time will tell whether this campaign was an anomaly or a harbinger of things to come. 
 
Our central focus in this paper has been on the strategies used by actors to achieve or to block 
dismantling. More research is needed into the preferences driving policy dismantling – and on 
how opposition to the EU interacts with policy preferences.  For example, are the greener 
member states favouring local over EU level action, lest the latter succumbs to dismantling? The 
Commission‟s policy preferences certainly warrant further attention.  Since the Danish „no‟ vote, 
a profound culture change appears to have taken place inside that organisation.  The dominant 
frame in EU policy making now appears to be that of „self-restraint‟, but it has taken a long time 
to take root (it was first espoused by Sir Leon Brittan back in 1992 (Agence Europe 1992c)).  
The US experience of dismantling provides some possible explanations for this change. Layzer 
has argued that US Conservatives had built „a compelling antiregulatory storyline to counter the 
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environmentalist narrative‟ (Layzer, 2012 p. 4). A similar framing has become pervasive in 
Brussels: „[e]verybody is talking the language of red tape (…) [it] has become the dominant 
narrative to the point that even the people who disagree with it are using the same language, like 
the left-wing parties in the Parliament or the NGOs‟ (Interview - Environment NGO, 11.2014b). 
This suggests that the Commission may have changed from actively opposing and/or delaying 
dismantling through symbolic measures (Explanations 1 and 3) to openly supporting more active 
dismantling.  This finding is significant because it goes against standard assumptions that the 
Commission is hard-wired to oppose dismantling as it is a threat to its raison d’être – advancing 
European integration (Löfstedt 2007). It is also not the case that (c.f. Steinebach and Knill 2017) 
the Commission has simply engaged in „dismantling by default‟, i.e. allowing a de facto 
reduction of environmental standards by failing to update them to changing environmental 
conditions (Bauer & Knill 2014).  It is also different to the argument that the environmental 
acquis has reached such a mature stage that the Commission‟s main task is to revise and update 
existing policies (Burns et al. 2019). Rather, our research reveals something new – the 
Commission is actively engaging in a sustained campaign to limit new and dismantle existing 
regulations as part of an explicit pro-European integration strategy. It extends to all areas of its 
work, not just DG Environment (Kassim et al. 2017). 
 
The changes in the Commission may change policy dynamics at EU level.  In the past, 
dismantling was advocated by states but opposed by the Commission and the Parliament 
(Explanation 1). However, if the Commission henceforth moves from opposing to supporting 
dismantling, then the remaining opponents will be the greener member states and the Parliament 
– a much-diminished coalition.  It is also worth remembering that as well as making policy 
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dismantling more likely at EU level, the Commission‟s complete control over the legislative 
agenda also means that its change of attitude may also make the risk of gridlock much more 
likely – and give it a particularly European flavour. Thus, unlike the US, gridlock would not 
come from opposing forces during the legislative stage (Explanation 1) – but through the 
removal of policy proposals at the pre-legislative stage, making it difficult for green states and 
the European Parliament to prevent it: 
 
„if the Commission wants to withdraw a proposal, it withdraws a proposal and that‟s it. 
Parliament can show they are unhappy about it but they can‟t do anything.‟ (Interview: 
Environment NGO 11.2014c). 
 
Finally, the growing support for dismantling within the European Commission raises questions 
not only about the future of the acquis but about the very nature of the EU itself. Should the EU 
even be considered a regulatory state if the Commission actively dismantles the regulatory 
acquis, perhaps heralding the start of a new era of European disintegration by stealth? 
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Table 1. Four Ideal-Types of Dismantling strategy 
 
 
 Low visibility   
Blame avoidance strategies 
High visibility  
Credit claiming strategies 
No dismantling decision 
Passive dismantling 
strategies 
Dismantling by default 
De facto reduction of 
environmental protection by 
refraining from adjusting 
existing levels to changing 
external conditions.  
Symbolic dismantling 
Political actors very 
deliberately declare their 
intentions to dismantle 
existing policies. (…) 
however, political 
declarations do not lead to 
respective outputs. 
Active dismantling decision  
Active dismantling strategies 
Dismantling by arena shifting 
Transfer the whole policy 
(possibly with a different 
budget) to a different arena 
such as another government 
level (i.e. decentralization). 
Active dismantling 
Exhibits high visibility with a 
strong and clear preference 
to dismantle. Politicians may 
not only want to be perceived 
as dismantlers; they may 
actually wish to dismantle 
existing policies.  
 
Source: based on Bauer and Knill (2014, p. 39-40) 
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Table 2. Indicative Example of Symbolic/Active dismantling continuum 
 
Symbolic dismantling                                                                                                                      Active Dismantling  
Member state 
commissions report on 
dismantling policy 
Report is supported by 
other member states 
Report topic is put on the 
Council‟s agenda by the 
rotating Council 
presidency 
Report recommendations 
are supported in Council 
meeting conclusions  
European Commission 
sets up advisory panel to 
study policy ambition in 
a given policy area 
Advisory panel 
recommends policy 
dismantling in given 
policy area 
European Commission 
communication echoes 
advisory panel 
recommendations 
European Commission 
yearly work plan 
includes dismantling 
specific policy 
instrument 
Member of European 
Parliament calls for 
policy dismantling 
Rapporteur calls for 
dismantling of precise 
instrument  
Parliamentary Committee 
supports Rapporteur call 
for dismantling 
Parliamentary plenary 
supports it  
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